Contents 1: Questions for Neoreactionaries. 2: Richard Posner: Has the United States, by Virtue of Its Size and Complexity, Become Ungovernable? (Part 9A can be read here.) 1: Questions for Neoreactionaries. Can USG be restructured? That is, can its archaic, proto-progressive constitutional design be re-designed so that Imperium in Imperio is removed and that … Continue reading The STEEL-cameralist Manifesto Part 9B: Posner, Power and Profit: Judge Posner on the Federal Government as a Modern Corporation – a Critical Analysis.
Contents 1: General Summary of the Manifesto’s Thus Far. 2: Philosophical Summary of the STEEL-cameralist Manifesto. 1: General Summary of the Manifesto’s Thus Far. 1: The Western world, and America in particular, is undergoing a crisis. 2: The concept of a “crisis” here is used in the specific, Kuhnian sense of the term. 3: The nature … Continue reading The STEEL-cameralist Manifesto Part 9A: The Permanent War against the Minotaur.
(The third and final entry in the series, see part I and II.) Americans simply are not in touch with just how close we are to war on the Korean peninsula. U.S Senator, Tammy Duckworth. (Source.) A full scale nuclear conflagration could break out and millions of Americans would greet such a thing … Continue reading The North Korean Nuclear Crisis III: Determinism, Diplomacy and Averting Destruction.
Reading the following article, it brought to our attention once more a pattern we have long observed about the behavior of the Left. As a joke, we have decided to re-work what is known as Godwin's law. Unsurprisingly, we call it STEEL's law: As a discussion over anything grows longer, the probability that the discussion … Continue reading Imperial Energy V Godwin and Rawls on Discourse and Justice.
Contents: Act I: God, Men and Monsters. AI:1 Steering the Ship of STEEL. AI:2 What It Means to Be the King of Everything. A1:3 Fnargl V Twilight-Mountain. AI:4 The Romance of the Three Tsars (White, Red and Yellow). Act II: Harbinger. AII:1 A Day in the Life of a Sovereign. AII:2 … Continue reading The STEEL-cameralist Manifesto Part 8 STEEL Sovereignty: From Equipoise to Energy.
Artist-Tyrant wrote the following in a comment from this post: Imperial Energy, what are your thoughts on Moldbug’s comments on Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn’s analysis of Fascism as Left-Wing: “While I admire the efforts of Kuehnelt-Leddihn and the like to describe National Socialism as left-wing, I have to disagree. To K-L, “right is right and left … Continue reading A Response To Artist-Tyrant on the Nature of Left and Right and National Socialism.
Following on from last week’s post where we outlined the warrant for war, we consider how likely war is between USG and North Korea. We decided to adopt a Q&A format, for it seemed the best way to structure and present our thoughts. 1: What do we mean by war? We mean that USG … Continue reading The North Korean Crisis II: Prospects of War.
Some reflections. Following on from our post On Truth we link to four recent pieces that have caught our attention. However, a day after that we came across an excellent post from Anti-Puritan and so we close with reflections on one of his recent posts. The first is from Andrew Klavan, at City Journal, with his Crudeness and … Continue reading The True, The Good and the Useful.
Chateau is going to be all over this from the Guardian. (The liberal "hamstering" from the black, female author jumps right out at you here.) Why? Why are white women and white men like this? Peter Frost has a theory: Part 1. Part 2. Part 3. That, or they just like big, black dick from … Continue reading White Women and the Red Pill.
“The U.S. has been a reasonably successful steward of world peace along some dimensions, no doubt, but we seem to be particularly bad at colonialism for reasons the Battle of Tora Bora perhaps highlights- once a government (or even loosely affiliated military group) is in theory our ally, under our tutelage and cooperating with our military machine, we seem to have no ability to view its actions or abilities objectively. Maybe the reason Britain was, all-in-all more successful as a colonial power despite never exerting the kind of world military dominance the U.S. has since World War II is that, as representatives of a class-based and explicitly hierarchical society, the Eton boys running things for Britain never felt tempted to the kinds of faux egalitarianism that often guides American colonial ventures astray. In his excellent if self-indulgent account of walking across Afghanistan immediately after the Taliban’s fall, The Places in Between, Rory Stewart (an Eton boy turned world traveler and, later, an Iraq War provincial administrator and Tory MP) describes the policy wonks eager to take the reins of the new Central Asian Switzerland in 2001:
For the last three months, whenever I reached an internet cafe, I had received an email from someone who had gone to govern Afghanistan. They started passing the UN application forms around in 2001 and then the circulars appeared: “Please don’t expect to write to this email – there is no internet connection in Kabul. ” Finally, there were messages from new addresses “@pak.id” “@afghangov.org” “‘@worldbank.org” “@un.org,” talking about the sun in the mountains. I now had half a dozen friends working in embassies, thinktanks, international development agencies, the UN and the Afghan government, controlling projects worth millions of dollars. A year before they had been in Kosovo or East Timor and in a year’s time they would have been moved to Iraq or Washington or New York.
Their objective was (to quote the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan) “The creation of a centralised, broad-based, multi-ethnic government committed to democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. They worked twelve- or fourteen- hour days, drafting documents for heavily-funded initiatives on “democratisation”, “enhancing capacity”, “gender”, “sustainable development,” “skills training” or “protection issues”. They were mostly in their late twenties or early thirties, with at least two degrees – often in international law, economics or development. They came from middle class backgrounds in Western countries and in the evenings they dined with each other and swapped anecdotes about corruption in the Government and the incompetence of the United Nations. They rarely drove their 4WDs outside Kabul because they were forbidden to do so by their security advisers. There were people who were experienced and well informed about conditions in rural areas of Afghanistan. But such people were barely fifty individuals out of many thousands. Most of the policy makers knew next to nothing about the villages where 90% 0f the population of Afghanistan lived. They came from post-modern, secular, globalised states with liberal traditions in law and government. It was natural for them to initiate projects on urban design, women’s rights and fibre-optic cable networks, to talk about transparent, clean and accountable processes, tolerance and civil society and to speak of a people “who desire peace at any cost and understand the need for a centralised multi-ethnic government”.”
We recently wrote:
“10: The last component, most central to public management, involved a broadly ‘professional’ and proto-bureaucratic vision of government.
Good public management in this vision involves staffing the state bureaucracy by permanent salaried middle-class professionals, recruited by examination rather than by patronage or sale of office (as with the adoption of civil service examinations in Prussia from 1770), and with a college training in economics and public management.
Professionalization goes with formalization, for good public management needs mechanisms for making sure that public officials carry out their duties properly and according to law.
NC not only is extremely critical of modern bureaucratic government and the salaried middle-class professionals who staff it but rejects this “vision of government” in its entirety.
Nevertheless, Moldbug said very little as to where a new “staff” might come from and how they might be trained. However, looking for such a thing is perhaps a mistake. Moldbug once described the role of the sovereign CEO as a “contractor of contractors”. Many talented people already exist and are capable of governance “straight out of the box” so to speak; thus, the task is to find them and given them enough power and responsibility to do what needs to be done.
SC, however, theoretically explores the training, experience and selection of such a staff which is similar to the Roman “course of honours” of antiquity. (The following is a good “data point” to consider.)”
In the mid-2000s, I was in a teaching methods class with an Army vet who had recently come back from Afghanistan and had been at the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. His story about the battle matched what was later released anonymously as “Fury’s Account,” that Bin Laden had been effectively isolated but the higher-ups decided that allied Afghan forces rather than U.S. troops should be the ones to capture or kill Bin Laden, and that the Afghans deliberately or accidentally let him escape into Pakistan.
Who made that call? Putting aside whether Afghanistan is such a tribal society and alien culture that the prospects for it as a stable democracy in the long-term are minimal, the Taliban had only fallen a few weeks before. Why would you entrust the main objective of the whole Afghanistan invasion to ostensibly allied forces of a government that didn’t…
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