STEEL-cameralist Manifesto Part 3c: The Age of Crisis; Crime, Chaos, Conflict and the Centralising Power.


1:The Paradigm of Power and the Imperial Formula.

2: Patrons, Proxies and the Poz.

3: De Bello Islamica.

4:The Second Anomaly.

5: Faulty Grand Strategic Assumptions.

6: Punks or Priests?

7: The Tranzis.

8: Malice or Military Incompetence?

9: Assumptions, Anomalies and the Delusions of Progress.

10: The Reality Behind the Formal Assumptions.

11: Conclusion.

Of all the Consulate’s policies, the one to smash rural brigandage was among the most popular. ‘The art of policing is in punishing infrequently and severely,’ Napoleon believed, but in his war against the brigands who were terrorizing vast areas of France, he tended to punish both frequently and severely.

Napoleon interned and deported suspected brigands, and used the death penalty against convicted ones, who were often called such unedifying names as ‘The Dragon’, ‘Beat-to-Death’ and ‘The Little Butcher of Christians’, and who raided isolated farmhouses as well as hijacking coaches and robbing travellers.

In November 1799, some 40 per cent of France was under martial law, but within three years it was safe to travel around France again, and trade could be resumed.Not even his Italian victories brought Napoleon more popularity.


In March 1800 the Consulate replaced more than 3,000 elected judges, public prosecutors and court presidents with its own appointees. Political opinions don’t seem to have been the deciding factor so much as practical expertise, as well as Napoleon’s keenness to sack elderly, corrupt or incompetent lawyers. It took seven months for the system to run smoothly again due to the backlogs, but thereafter the delivery of justice was improved.

He insisted that his prefects provide him with systematic statistical data, ordering them to make extensive annual tours of their departments to glean first-hand information. He would later describe them as empereurs au petit pied (mini-emperors). Boniface de Castellane-Novejean, prefect of the Basses-Pyrénées, summed up the prefect’s task as to ‘make sure that the taxes are paid, that the conscription is enacted, and that law and order is preserved’. In fact he also had to impound horses for the cavalry, billet troops, guard prisoners-of-war, stimulate economic development, deliver political support for the government at plebiscites and elections, fight brigands and represent the views of the department, especially its elites, to the government. Only in areas in which Napoleon wasn’t interested, such as the relief of the poor and primary education, was much power left with the departments.

In less than fifteen weeks Napoleon had effectively ended the French Revolution, seen off the Abbé Sieyès, given France a new constitution, established her finances on a sound footing, muzzled the opposition press, started to end both rural brigandage and the long-running war in the Vendée, set up a Senate, Tribunate, Legislative.

A recent study of Rouen during the Consulate concluded that Napoleon’s most popular measures to have been the Concordat, the defeat of brigandage and the guaranteeing of the land-ownership rights of the acquéreurs, in that order.

Napoleon the Great. Andrew Roberts.

1: The Paradigm of Power and the Imperial Formula.

Insecure power corrupts and absolute insecure power corrupts absolutely.

Divided power is power at permanent war.

A ruler only becomes a tyrant when he does not have enough power.

China’s ruling elite may be faulted for many things, one thing they cannot be faulted for, however, is subjecting the Chinese people to an invasion of Muslim immigration, rape, torture and terror.


One of the assumptions of the modern age is that it is a time of unqualified peace and security.

Ask yourself why, however, is France in a state of national emergency? A national emergency, moreover, that has lasted for two years?

If wars are a thing of the past, then why is USG at war in, at least, seven different countries?

If progress is something that happens necessarily, and cannot be reversed, why has slavery returned?

If the Cold War signalled the end of History, why do pundits talk about a “new Cold War”?

These facts are anomalies that challenge the paradigm of power.

The age of crisis is a crisis of the state; the crisis consists of an interlocking series of challenges involving crisis security, the national economy, information and information centres.

Today, we examine the crisis of domestic and global security.

All regimes have, what Gaetano Mosca calls, the political formula. A formula is a story about Power: who has it; why they have it; and why they should keep it. In other words, the formula is a story about political legitimacy. Paraphrasing Napoleon, we can say that “legitimacy” is a fiction agreed upon.

Political paradigms are not formulas, but every paradigm has a formula. A political formula is both the intellectual justification and explanation of the paradigm and its popular and emotional expression.

Over the next three parts, we will examine three pillars of USG’s Imperial Formula.

Every regime’s paradigm contains assumptions and theories concerning security; economics and what Richard Fernandez calls the “Narrative.”

All three, when functional, constitute regime legitimacy because form matches reality. If one pillar begins to weaken or fall apart, the regimes relies on the other two pillars to maintain itself. How resilient the regime is is largely a factor of how well it can function in the face of shocks, attacks, surprises or if one or more of these pillars are removed.

Richard Fernandez, in his short, but excellent essay War of the Words describes the USG’s Imperial paradigm as follows:

The construction of this edifice of legitimacy was consciously started when the Second World War neared its end at the Bretton Woods conference. There the US undertook to provide the reserve currency into which other international currencies were in principle convertible. The US would issue the foundation –the financial primitive –into which all other currencies could be expressed. For so long as the dollar –or its equivalent –existed, there would be a medium of exchange among the economies of the world. Money was the first foundation stone.

The other critical thing the US contributed to the edifice of global legitimacy was confidence in global security. After years of bloody conflict in the mid-20th century populations needed confidence that ships could again voyage the seas, airliners cross the skies and communications cables carrying information flows could be laid undisturbed. That security was provided largely by the United States Navy, “the premier force for power projection on the planet and the guarantor of world peace”. 

In the years since 1945, it provided all the nations of the world –even US rivals like China –with a world of law and order in which they could prosper and grow rich. So long as things worked, the international community had no incentive to rock the boat.

In America, the third element of the crisis –after the economic and security aspects –was in clear view. In the United States, it was evident as nowhere else that the disparate economic and security crises of the world were intertwined. And the thing that held them together was something called the Narrative. 

The Narrative was the third and political element, the binder that combined economics and security into legitimacy.


But because the economic and security subsystems were being neglected the Narrative was increasingly all that was keeping things going. It was as if a three legged stool were on the verge of collapse, but that its condition was being concealed by tilting it so that it was precariously balanced on one leg. 

During the Second World War, the United States conquered, converted and corralled both its enemies – Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany – and its nominal allies – Britain, France and Western Europe, in addition with emerging Sunni Muslim states like Saudi Arabia, into a new, global, political-economic architecture – the American Imperium.

Since 1945 then, the Western world, and much of the rest, has been governed according to this paradigm or consensus – the vital centre, which always moves left.

Throughout the Cold War, USG maintained, more or less successfully, the security of its key allies and vassals from Communist encroachment and internal insurrection. While the Cold War was much more violent and unstable than what the current consensus might believe, it was a system and it was stable. Fernandez:

A widely accepted, global order did not mean that all conflict had ceased, but it did mean that major, world-shattering conflicts could be things of the past. America became the tiebreaker, court of last resort, guardian of the Global Commons, enabler of the flow of information and maintainer of all things necessary to prevent international conflict, quite apart from being the lender of last resort and provider of the final backstop for the global economic system. While the junior members might occasionally grumble, as long as the system remained approximately fair there was no compelling reason to challenge it directly.

The Cold War is over, however. The system that was in place for that conflict no longer has any reason for existence.

What was the purpose of NATO, after the Cold War?

Why did USG maintain the size and strength of its military after the Cold War? Why did USG not become a “normal” country?

Why should USG continue to promote democracy and promote Human Rights across the globe?

Ultimately, with the Cold War over, what is the purpose of USG now?

2: USG’s Grand Strategy: A Case of Cunning Incompetence?

The framework for trying to understand the post-Cold War era is the following laws and principles, set out here, which frame our understanding of USG:

“The first principle of politics is that politics is the struggle for power and the second principle is that if you have power, your goal is to keep it.”


Naturally, this Law implies that in any organisation the elites are functionally necessary and inevitable.

This Law is the Iron Law of Oligarchy.”

USG, after the Cold War was and still is a global colossus and its purpose was to keep it that way. This meant degrading and defeating any remnant domestic opposition and degrading and disrupting any external opposition. With the lack of any serious competitors acting as external constrainers, the Ruling Elite pursued with abandon their own rationally self-interested objectives. The fundamental principles of USG’s Grand Strategy were to prevent the rise of any potential challengers for control of the Eurasian landmass, or “World Island” to use Halford Mackinder’s term.

This required a divided, beaten and broken up Russia absorbed into Europe (the soon to be European Union); a democratising China and a militarily weak Japan; as for the rest: open borders and open for business.

Things have not, formally speaking, gone to plan.

First, USG blundered badly with Russia. USG betrayed the trust of a prostrate Russia over a “gentleman’s agreement” that promised no NATO expansion. Secondly, USG supported the threatening expansion of the European Union up to Russia’s borders, specifically in the Ukraine. Ukraine, as Brzezinski pointed out in the Grand Chessboard, is a “pivot” country for Russia. Russia without Ukraine is a country, but Russia with Ukraine is an empire.

For decades now, USG has suffered from “strategic autism” in dealing with Russia, or just arrogant belligerence. (See Peter Hitchens. )

The blog, Lead and Gold, recounts, perhaps, the seed of this colossal act of strategic incompetence.


I’m sure Putin and the Russians remember this even if our politicians and pundits have consigned it to the memory hole: 

The story begins with President George H. W. Bush’s assurances to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, echoed by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, that if the Soviet Union would accept a reunified Germany’s membership in the NATO alliance, its expansion would go no further.

That is a fairly important promise that was broken somewhere along the line. All thanks to Bill Clinton’s anti-strategic approach to foreign policy
Let me begin with the event that caused us to begin teaching this class. The date was September 24, 1998. A NATO briefing team had invited itself to Yale to make the case for the Clinton administration’s policy of expanding the alliance eastward. There would be no problem about including the Czechs, the Poles, and the Hungarians, the briefers told us, because so much effort had gone into reorganizing committees in Brussels to make them feel welcome. The briefing concluded after about half an hour, and questions were called for. 

Our colleague Bruce Russett raised his hand and asked whether NATO expansion might not cause difficulties with the Russians, perhaps undermining President Yeltsin’s efforts to democratize the country, perhaps creating an awkward situation for the new or prospective members of the alliance as Russian power revived, perhaps even driving Russia into some new form of cooperation with the Chinese, thereby reversing one of the greatest victories for the West in the Cold War, which was the Sino-Soviet split. There was a moment of shocked silence. Then one of the briefers exclaimed, in front of our entire audience: “Good God! We’d never thought of that!”

What is USG’s strategy regarding China?

Christopher Coker, writing in Improbable War: China, the United States and the Logic of Great Power Conflict claimed that USG has pursued an incoherent strategy regarding China. USG schizophrenically shifts between treating China as a friend, a rival or an enemy.

As for the Muslim world, the threat emanating from that region was long foreseen, yet nothing was done.

Indeed, the opposite of nothing was done.

USG involved itself in an unnecessary war in the Gulf against Iraq –  a war which laid the grounds for 9/11; then, an unnecessary war in the Balkans, which “poisoned” relations with Russia and China.

China, meanwhile, is not democratising.

Russia, now resentful, sees USG as an agent of chaos.


Is this incompetence, or is there something else at work?

3: Patrons, Proxies and the Poz.

According to the Patron Theory of Politics – which is the foundation of Absolutist neoreaction –  the unsecure, central power (controlled by elites) use proxies to degrade and diminish troublesome “essentials” or essential institutions (foreign or domestic) which are obstacles to the central, centralising power.

For USG, one way of subverting its enemies abroad is via Foundations, NGOs, political activists (and “terrorists”), human rights campaigners etc. etc. Foundations sponsoring political agitation played an important role in undermining the Soviet Union for instance, and they are at work again against Russia. But today, Russia is wise to the threat. Patron Theory:

From the Balkans to the Middle East and North Africa, and now Eastern Europe again, human rights have been deployed and NGOs have engaged in governmental disruption, something which Russian strategic thinkers have picked up on in a somewhat incomplete manner. In an article in the Military Review “Getting Gerasimov Right” it is claimed that:

In the Russian view, the pattern of U.S. forced regime change has been as follows: deciding to execute a military operation; finding an appropriate pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons of mass destruction; and finally, launching a military operation to cause regime change.

However, Russia believes that the pattern of forced U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely supplanted by a new method. Instead of an overt military invasion, the first volleys of a U.S. attack come from the instalment of a political opposition through state propaganda (e.g., CNN, BBC), the Internet and social media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). After successfully instilling political dissent, separatism, and/or social strife, the legitimate government has increasing difficulty maintaining order. As the security situation deteriorates, separatist movements can be stoked and strengthened, and undeclared special operations, conventional, and private military forces (defense contractors) can be introduced to battle the government and cause further havoc. Once the legitimate government is forced to use increasingly aggressive methods to maintain order, the United States gains a pretext for the imposition of economic and political sanctions, and sometimes even military sanctions such as no-fly zones, to tie the hands of the besieged governments and promote further dissent.

Eventually, as the government collapses and anarchy results, military forces under the guise of peacekeepers can then be employed to pacify the area, if desired, and a new government that is friendly to the United States and the West can be installed.[liii] 

Such strategies of subversion are just particular cases of a very old and very general strategy of “proxy warfare” or “sowing dissent among the enemy”; it is, however, the main weapon in the centralising power’s arsenal as Patron Theory asserts:

It is unsurprising that the Russians faced with the strange actions emanating from this US human rights nexus created by foundations should be so bewildered by the techniques employed. However, there are vast holes in the Russian analysis of the situation. The beginning of this process in the current human rights guise can be traced back to 1975 with some accuracy, however the mechanism of outside actors funding destabilising elements is central to unsecure power, and it is only credulence of the political divisions asserted by political theory and the belief of genuine spontaneous revolution which blinds us to this.

(See the Military Review article on getting Gerasimov Right here.)

As a result of USG’s “permanent world revolution” and its culture of “protest” China’s leaders, meanwhile, worry about “infection” from Chinese students returning from the American universities.

Sam Harris, writing in the End of Faith, claims that what Muslims like Bin Laden worry about, above all, is contamination.

Is it any wonder? Even in the Guardian – the bastion of progressivism – articles like the following are written about how human rights are tools of a new kind of imperialism.

As a result, smaller, weaker nations have begun to “band together” because of fear and resentment against an aggressive, imperial, predatory power: U S G.

Yet, as Christopher Coker claimed, this is a “strategic nightmare” for the West: a Russia-China alliance.

President Trump, meanwhile, instinctively senses that USG would be better off in an alliance with Russia; yet, the possibility of a “re-start” has been met with shrieking hostility from the progressive elites, despite the evident advantages.

Michael Totten sums up the attitude of the progressive elites well when he writes:

First things first. You need to get real about Russia.

No more “resets” or “bromances.” Vladimir Putin is not your friend.

He is implacably hostile to the U.S. and Europe for one simple reason. He recoils from the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, just as we would have done had the Soviet Union won the Cold War and expanded the Warsaw Pact to Brussels and Amsterdam.

Would it be great if we could get along with Russia or reset relations? Of course. But it’s not going to happen because there’s not a damn thing you can to do change Russia’s national interests or its centuries-long hostility toward its neighbors. You want to know what Putin hears when you outstretch your hand and say we should be partners? He hears what Luke Skywalker heard in The Empire Strikes Back when Darth Vader said, “Join me and together we can rule the galaxy as father and son.

(Curiously, Totten sees USG as “Vader” and Putin as “Luke Skywalker” – a theme echoed in this post here.)

The truth, however, is that Russia is not an existential threat to USG. In fact, USG has much to gain from a strategic alliance with Russia. Pragmatically Distributed is completely correct when he writes:

The main advantages for America to working with Russia include –

  • Securing the geopolitical and economic stability of Europe
  • Acting as a hedge against China
  • Stabilizing the Middle East
  • Freeing up significant American resources to handle other potential threats; resources that, in case of hostile relations with Russia, would otherwise have to be invested in Europe

One consideration that is not a factor for Hamiltonians is the authoritarian nature of Putin’s government. 

Our goal here is not prescriptive, but descriptive; it is clear that USG has succeeded in creating the conditions for a coalescing of once neutral or rival regimes into alliances based on mutual fear and resentment. The world is sick of USG telling them how to live and threatening and killing them if they don’t. Muslim terrorism is simply the loudest and clearest expression of this animus.

4: De Bello Islamica.

Before 9/11, the evidence was clear that Jihadi and Islamist groups saw America as an existential enemy; Osama Bin Laden, however, had the strategic vision to launch a humiliating strike against USG and to then lure its military into Afghanistan in order to “bleed it” in the same way they “bled” the Soviets.

If the grand strategic follies of the 1990s lit the fuse for the current security crisis, then the crisis itself can be said to have begun on September 11, 2001.

Following 9/11, if we interpret USG’s reaction in a formal way, then this is what USG did:

1: The invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq with the formula of “democracy promotion” in the Middle East.

2: Either igniting or fanning the flames of the Arab Spring in the hope of “progress”.

3: Supporting “rebels” in Syria against Assad.

No progressive will doubt the failure of USG to achieve its “formal” aims.

Formally, the reason for the failure is that these strategic failures are the acts of a super-power – an informal empire – that was trying and failing to find the proper pace and tempo, role and rhythm for ruling the world, after the end of the Cold War.

George Friedman, whom we see more of in a moment, explained USG’s incompetence using an analogy involving a tug-of-war contest where one side drops the rope and the side still holding it becomes unbalanced and stumbles as a result.

Formally, USG was humiliated by 9/11. It was punched in the face. So it punched back. It knocked down the Taliban, but it was still not satisfied. So, to paraphrase Edward Luttwak, USG looked around and saw Saddam Hussein standing there looking like “a man with a gun”  – a proven liar and evil man – and so, because USG considered itself entitled to a “free war”, it punched.

This, however, is the formal reading of USG’s intentions and the explanation of its own failure.

Formal analysis is where we assume that the public reasons for some action are the real reasons.

However, from the Machiavellian method of political analysis, form is only a mask for reality.

Here is, probably, Ex-CIA and geo-political strategist, George Friedman, describing precisely this distinction between form and reality in his 2009 book the Next 100 Hundred Years:

The foregoing allows us to understand the American response to the Islamist attacks and much else that has happened. Having systematically achieved its strategic goals, the United States had the ultimate aim of preventing the emergence of any major power in Eurasia. The paradox, however, is as follows: the goal of these interventions was never to achieve something—whatever the political rhetoric might have said—but to prevent something. The United States wanted to prevent stability in areas where another power might emerge. Its goal was not to stabilize, but to destabilize. And that explains how the United States responded to the Islamic earthquake—it wanted to prevent a large, powerful Islamic state from emerging.
Rhetoric aside, the United States has no overriding interest in peace in Eurasia. The United States also has no interest in winning a war outright. As with Vietnam or Korea, the purpose of these conflicts is simply to block a power or destabilize the region, not to impose order. In due course, even outright American defeat is acceptable. However, the principle of using minimum force, when absolutely necessary, to maintain the Eurasian balance of power is—and will remain—the driving force of U.S[…]”

Friedman, George. “The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century.

USG did not intend to bring “democracy” or “freedom” to Iraq but chaos. The key assumption that must be rejected in understanding USG’s MO is that it is not a protector and nor is it a parasite – USG is a predator.

The Grand Master once described USG as a “vampire”; though he later, mistakenly, backed away from the analogy. Here is what he said:

America, you see, is not really the vampire of the world. The analogy is inexact in two ways. One, a vampire is nourished by the blood of his victims. They grow weak and sickly, while he thrives in ruddy good health. Two, it is always easy to know that a vampire has been eatin’ on you, because there are fang-marks on your neck.

America is more the arsonist of the world. As well as the fireman. Wherever fires break out, Uncle Sam is there to pour gasoline on them. The fireman assures us, of course, that he is only setting a backfire to defeat the main blaze. But why is this always the right strategy? Why was he the first one on the scene? Why do his hoses always seem to get tangled, whereas his gas can never runs dry? And why have there been so many more fires since he came to town? But the TV audience sees none of this. All they see is the fireman, fighting the fires.

With all due respect to the Master, one wonders what exactly the intentions of the fireman are. Of course, if he is a pyromaniac, then the matter is settled. USG is the world’s alpha predator; its actions indeed resemble that of a vampire.

How is USG nourished by its victims?

If we start at the end of WWII, where we have the American Minotaur of War coming into full and permanent existence, USG replaced the British Empire, knocked out France and destroyed Germany and Japan. China, meanwhile, was handed over to the Communists thus ensuring a retarded and prostrate country for a good many decades. The Marshal plan, meanwhile, which involved re-building the European economies, ensured that USG would have a large and open market for its goods. Its support for decolonisation in Africa and Asia would mean that all these newly “independent” countries would be dependent upon USG’s grace and favour. Finally, USG opened its borders to immigration – thus literally draining the rest of the world of many of its best human capital, on the one hand, and its worst on the other.

Today, however, the malaise in Europe – such as in France – ultimately benefits USG because, well, where will all the fleeing Frenchmen and women go to, if not America? A failing Europe is a weak Europe and the weak is what USG hunts. Michael Leeden is reported to have said that USG’s rule was that:

Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.

USG’s motto could easily be that of Lenin’s quip: “the worse it gets the better it will be.”

How so? How does chaos – the cosmic signature of leftism – benefit USG?

Firstly, chaos prevents any regional challengers from emerging.

Secondly, with respect to the Middle East, it disrupts the various Muslim states from forming alliances that threaten USG’s interests.

Thirdly, it creates a kill zone for Jihadists – Syria, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan today and Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or France tomorrow.

Fourthly, it discredits “radical Islamism” and creates political and social coalitions at home and abroad against them.

Fifthly, foreign wars justify not only the military’s existence but the military budget – which means profit for the arms manufactures and then kick-backs to Senators and lobbyists. Finally, all these wars provide experience and a testing ground for the military’s latest weapons of war.

Of course, permanent war keeps the military out of the country and not de-mobilised at home and causing trouble. Permanent war, however, allows the regime to operate in a permanent state of emergency – thus, any laws or rights can be waved away if and when necessary.

Both the left and the nominal right are players in the game. The war business is the “right side” or the “away team” and subversion is the “left-side” or “home team.”

At home, however, USG uses proxies to subvert and breakdown any internal opposition. This practice is known by many names: Political Correctness, Cultural Marxism or the Frankfurt School. Focus less on the origins or its current ideological clothing, but on who is doing this; why they are doing it; and how Imperium in Imperio creates a perverse set of incentives for it all to happen.

So, team Blue, under President Obama helps Iran, while Saudi Arabia and Israel are angry. The Saudis and the Israelis then sponsor team Red; then, with President Trump, they are supported with weapons and encouraged to goad Iran. The final result, USG surely hopes, is war.

The trouble is that when form does not match reality, and it is form which maintains the illusion of regime legitimacy, the entire paradigm and the security of the Ruling Elite are threatened.

USG’s legitimacy as an empire was premised on the promise (and perception) of security. The fact of insecurity – civil war, terrorism, great-power conflict – contradicts USG’s claim to legitimacy. Political and cultural struggle casts doubt upon the entire progressive End of History thesis.

See the following for European people’s fear of terrorism.

It is not just the fact and perception of insecurity that forms part of the crisis – it also involves imagining the future

You can talk people out of their fears, but not relieve them out of their anxieties, suspicions and grievances over their lost hopes and dreams.

5: The Second Anomaly and USG’s Faulty Grand Strategic Assumptions.

This is the second anomaly: the crisis of global and domestic security.

As with our first anomaly – where the form of democracy was contradicted by the reality of technocracy – the second anomaly is the contradiction of formal talk and formal assumptions about peace, stability and the post-political world with the reality of war, instability and the resurgence of political and cultural struggle.

A regime must not only provide security, it must also be trusted to do so; furthermore, if a regime must fight, then it must win; lastly, the regime’s Ruling Elite need to be seen to share in the toil and turmoil of war.

What went wrong?

The following article, from War on the Rocks ,by Hal Brands and Paul Feaver, summarises the importance of assumptions and how key assumptions of USG’s Imperial paradigm is in crisis:

One reason that American grand strategy has remained fairly stable during the post-Cold War era is that the assumptions underlying it have also remained stable. Assumptions are the received wisdom among the policymaking elite — the intellectual axioms on which policy rests. They may be, for example, the core beliefs that policymakers hold about the nature and direction of the international system, their baseline views on a country’s particular role within that system, or their unstated “theories” about how some action will lead to some desired result. And crucially, although assumptions may sometimes be stated explicitly, they more often remain in the background, creating the implicit intellectual guidelines within which policy debates occur.

Assumption #1: American Military Primacy Today, in the Future, and Everywhere

Assumption #2: The Best Allies

Assumption #3: A Wealthy and Integrated China Will Be a Democratic and Peaceful China

Assumption #4: Great-Power War is Obsolete

Assumption #5: The Unstoppable and Irreversible Advance of Democracy

Assumption #6: Globalization is Inexorable

Assumption #7: Technology Will Save Us  

All of these assumptions are, however, underpinned by something more basic: what is the purpose of USG’s foreign policy?

Strategy depends upon assumptions and assumptions depend, in part, upon purpose.

The Grand Master set’s out three foreign policy possibilities that could serve as USG purpose:

Foreign Policy A: The Policy of Sages.

Foreign Policy B: The Policy of Soldiers.

Foreign Policy C: The Policy of Priests.

Foreign Policy A was the foreign policy set out by George Washington (and Alexander Hamilton). Today, it is derided as “isolationism”; in other words, it means a policy of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other nations.

In George Washington’s “Farewell Address” he advised America to:

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it – It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it ? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue ? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?


Washington’s “great rule” for America:

 The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Washington’s advice was the same as that given by Deng Xiaoping, which was that China should hide its “brightness”. Here is how the Official Chinese Media explains what it means:

The true meaning of the phrase is rooted deep in traditional Chinese culture. When prince Xiao Tong of the Southern Dynasty (AD 420-589) first used the term taoguang, he was referring to sages who would withdraw from public life. The first use of yanghui in the Song Dynasty (960-1279) was to describe self-cultivation in pursuit of accomplishment. Up to the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), either alone or together, the two terms were used to refer to low-profile behavior, featuring cool-headedness, intricate planning and hard work. The phrase can be applied to both adverse and victorious times, and embraces an inner belief for engaging in unostentatious but diligent efforts aimed at far-sighted goals. In this way it is a basic precondition for yousuo zuowei or “trying to amount to something”. It has nothing to do with revenge or aggression.

The guideline matches China’s peaceful development path. Peaceful development is a feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Win-win cooperation, not regional or global hegemony, is the hallmark of the country’s opening-up to the outside world. Achieving the country’s long-term rejuvenation in a peaceful way requires national power and worldwide acknowledgement of its moral strength. Taoguang yanghui will lead China onto the moral high ground.

Foreign Policy A, then, could be called the foreign policy of the Sage.

Foreign Policy B, however, could be called the policy of the soldier, the colonist and the capitalist. It is predatory and pursues power to the nation, and prestige to the people:

During the French Republican and Napoleonic eras, art looting became standard practice for victorious armies.  Napoleon took over the leadership of the French army during the campaign in Italy that had begun disastrously, with under-nourished, unpaid soldiers on the brink of mutiny.  Stealing art from the conquered territories became a way of both raising funds to support the war effort, and to raise morale back at home in Paris, where the newly-converted Louvre museum would become a sort of trophy case for the victorious to display the treasures of the conquered.  His policy was first made clear in the armistice signed by the defeated Duke of Modena on 17 May 1796, which stated: “The Duke of Modena undertakes to hand over twenty pictures.  They will be selected by commissioners sent for that purpose from among the pictures in his gallery and realm.” This established a precedent for payment and reparations in the form of art that would continue, both encouraging conquerors and dismaying the conquered, for centuries.

Historical examples of this kind of policy are Alexander the Great’s war of conquest; Caesar’s conquest of Gaul; the Islamic conquest of India; England’s conquest of Ireland; American’s conquest of Mexico, and so on.

The third and final type, foreign policy C, is the policy of the Priest.

Priestly foreign policy means conquest as an act of charity. A invades B so that can B can benefit from A’s benevolence. They benefit – not with greater security or wealth – but by living in accord with certain Ideals: democracy, equality or liberty etc.

This policy is known as Wilsonianism.

(La Wik has three examples of “Wilsionian” foreign policy: 1. Bill Clinton’s state building in the Balkans (which, as we saw earlier, poisoned relations with Russia and China); 2.Intervention and state building in Afghanistan (still building after 16 years) and 3. Most recently, we have USG and its vassals (England and France) intervention to support “protesters” in Libya in 2011 (an action which has probably permanently divided the country in three parts.))

Woodrow Wilson who, as Jim Powell wrote, was a man who: “…. could impose his will on millions of people who lived thousands of miles away…”

Wilson did more than impose his will on millions; his actions ignited a train of events that led to the Russian Revolution, the rise of Hitler and the deaths and enslavement of tens of millions of people across Europe, Russia and ultimately Asia.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt followed in Wilson’s footsteps several decades later and the mould for USG was set.

USG moved from Republic to Empire.

6: Punks or Priests?

Martin Van Creveld has this to say about USG calling Kim Jong Un a “punk” over his provocations:

During this same period of sixty-four years the great, benevolent, apple pie-eating, mother-loving, and God-fearing American democracy, invariably inspired by the dream of liberty, equality and justice for all, has:

– Tried (and failed) to invade Cuba in 1961;

– Blockaded Cuba in 1962 (this particular act of war, probably the most dangerous in the   whole of history, almost led to a nuclear holocaust);

– Sent its troops to Vietnam (1963), where they waged war until 1973;

– Invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965;

– Invaded Cambodia in 1970;

– Sent troops to Lebanon in 1982;

– Invaded Grenada in 1983;

– Invaded Panama in 1989;

– Invaded Iraq in 1991;

– Invaded Somalia in 1993;

– Invaded Haiti in 1994;

– Bombed Bosnia in 1995;

– Bombed Iraq in 1998-99;

– Waged war against Serbia in 1999;

– Invaded Afghanistan in 2001;

– Invaded Iraq in 2003;

– Bombed Libya in 2011;

– Raided Yemen in 2017;

– Bombed Syria in 2017.

This list does not include US support, some of it military, to revolutions and counter-revolutions in countries such as Iran (1953), Indonesia (1965), Chile (1973), Nicaragua (1979-90), Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003, the Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). Directly or indirectly, Washington’s praiseworthy deeds have led to the death of millions of people.

With one exception (Afghanistan in 2002) all the bombings, invasions and interventions took place in countries that, with the worst will in the world, did not have what it takes to endanger to the mighty US. Without exception, they took place in countries that were small, weak, and often so far away that the average US citizen had never heard about them. Proving that, if you are a small, weak country, even one located on the other side of the world from the US, and plan to disobey Washington’s will while avoiding its oh-so tender mercies, the first thing you need are nukes and delivery vehicles to put them on target.

When we say that foreign policy C is the foreign policy of the “Priest”, this can be understood to be almost literally true; while Woodrow Wilson was, in fact, a Professor,  he was a devout Presbyterian ( and his father was a Protestant minister) and a Princeton man.

According to Fred Siegel, Wilson’s Protestantism and Progressivism (socialism) went arm in arm with democracy:

Wilson was the first and probably the only president to have studied socialism systematically. In 1887, as a young man, he responded to the growth of vast industrial monopolies that threatened individual freedom by arguing that “in fundamental theory socialism and democracy are almost if not quite one and the same. They both rest at bottom upon the absolute right of the community to determine its own destiny and that of its members. Men as communities are supreme over men as individuals.” In the 1912 presidential race, he said that “when you do socialism justice, it is hardly different from the heart of Christianity itself.” Four years later, he brushed aside intense opposition to appoint two pro-labor-union justices to the Supreme Court and backed railroad workers in their fight for an eight-hour day. The president imposed a surtax on the wealthy and won the support of such prominent socialists as Upton Sinclair and Helen Keller.

7: The Tranzis.

USG’s foreign policy then is a policy of priests. The formula is known as Liberal Idealism or, perhaps, Transnational Progressivism or Universalism. John Fonte, senior fellow, at the Hudson institute writes:

Nearly a year before the September 11 attacks, news stories provided a preview of the transnational politics of the future. In October 2000, in preparation for the UN Conference Against Racism, about fifty American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) called on the UN “to hold the United States accountable for the intractable and persistent problem of discrimination.”

The NGOs included Amnesty International-U. S.A. (AI-U. S.A.), Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Arab-American Institute, National Council of Churches, the NAACP, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and others. Their spokesman stated that their demands “had been repeatedly raised with federal and state officials [in the U. S.] but to little effect. In frustration we now turn to the United Nations.” In other words, the NGOs, unable to enact the policies they favored through the normal processes of American constitutional democracy—the Congress, state governments, even the federal courts—appealed to authority outside of American democracy and its Constitution.

Fonte summarises, in his own opinion, what the principles of “Tranzism” are:


The key concepts of transnational progressivism could be described as follows:

1: The ascribed group over the individual citizen

2: Group proportionalism as the goal of “fairness

3: The values of all dominant institutions to be changed to reflect the perspectives of the victim groups. 

4: The “demographic imperative.” 

5: The redefinition of democracy and “democratic ideals.” (Form V Reality IE).

6: Deconstruction of national narratives and national symbols of democratic nation-states in the West. 

7: Promotion of the concept of postnational citizenship

8: The idea of transnationalism as a major conceptual tool. 

Next, Fonte describes the Ruling Elites social base and institutions:

The social base of transnational progressivism constitutes a rising postnational intelligentsia (international law professors, NGO activists, foundation officers, UN bureaucrats, EU administrators, corporate executives, and politicians.)

Similarly, transnationalism, multiculturalism, and global governance, like “diversity,” are ideological tools championed by activist elites, not impersonal forces of history. The success or failure of these values-laden concepts will ultimately depend upon the political will and effectiveness of these elites.

Napoleon, Wellington, Metternich and Hamilton would have recognised Transnational Progressivism for exactly what it is: a Tag-Team of Jacobins and Liberals. The following extracts, provided by Pragmatically Distributed, show us that these priests have been around for a very long time:

Alexander Hamilton – The Stand No. III, [7 April 1798]

In reviewing the disgusting spectacle of the French revolution, it is difficult to avert the eye entirely from those features of it which betray a plan to disorganize the human mind itself, as well as to undermine the venerable pillars that support the edifice of civilized society. The attempt by the rulers of a nation to destroy all religious opinion, and to pervert a whole people to Atheism, is a phenomenon of profligacy reserved to consummate the infamy of the unprincipled reformers of France. The proofs of this terrible design are numerous and convincing.

Equal pains have been taken to deprave the morals as to extinguish the religion of the country, if indeed morality in a community can be separated from religion. It is among the singular and fantastic vagaries of the French revolution, that while the Duke of Brunswick was marching to Paris, a new law of divorce was passed; which makes it as easy for a husband to get rid of his wife, and a wife of her husband, as to discard a worn out habit. To complete the dissolution of those ties, which are the chief links of domestic and ultimately of social attachment, the Journals of the Convention record with guilty applause accusations preferred by children against the lives of their parents.

It is not necessary to heighten the picture by sketching the horrid groupe of proscriptions and murders which have made of France a den of pillage and slaughter; blackening with eternal opprobrium the very name of man.

Metternich, Volume III, Metternich to Gentz, 1819.

Page 270

April 23. — My proposals are confined to the discipline of the universities, and do not at all touch the studies themselves—two questions which are very closely related, but yet in the present discussion necessarily separated. If we meddle with the latter, nothing at all will be done, and a letter from Müller sufficiently points this out to me, in which in speaking of this affair he observes ‘ that the disorder in the universities proceeds from the Reformation and that it can only be really set right by the recall of the Reformation.’ I deny neither the assertion nor its justice. But here on the Quirinal I cannot meddle with Dr. Martin Luther, and I hope that nevertheless some good will come of it without even touching its source— Protestantism. The last very excellent letter of Müller’s reminded me involuntarily of Golowkin’s proposition for the investigation of ‘ Causes primitives de la révolution française.

Pragmatically Distributed then provides the following, remarkable, paragraph from Prince Metternich as to what he intuits as the final goal of the “idealists” of his day:

Is it necessary to give a proof of this last fact ? We think we have furnished it in remarking that one of the sentiments most natural to man, that of nationality, is erased from the Liberal catechism, and that where the word is still employed, it is used by the heads of the party as a pretext to enchain Governments, or as a lever to bring about destruction. The real aim of the idealists of the party is religious and political fusion, and this being analysed is nothing else but creating in favour of each individual an existence entirely independent of all authority, or of any other will than his own, an idea absurd and contrary to the nature of man, and incompatible with the needs of human society.

Metternich thought that the real aim of the idealists of his day (the Ruling Elite of ours) is “religious and political fusion” that somehow allows the individual to be “independent of all authority” and, most importantly, transcends ultimately the nation state itself.

The left, as a constantly adapting, evolving, political movement, is only attached to any group or any institution, including the nation state, instrumentally. Today’s progressives, like their dissenting protestant predecessors, undermine any and all obstacles in their path.

Metternich’s belief is the same as the conclusion reached by John Saranek, in his book the Myth of Liberalism which opens with the claim that: “ Contemporary liberalism is less a political philosophy than a façade for undermining extant social and legal mores.”

Thus, USG is committed to a “permanent revolution” at home and abroad.

To say that this does not make for safe, sane or profitable foreign or domestic policy is the understatement of the millennia.

8: Malice or Military Incompetence?

Here is an anomaly to ponder: Why Can’t USG win? USG, despite having the most powerful military in the world, cannot seem to successfully win wars against poorly equipped and poorly trained non-state actors whether in Vietnam or Afghanistan or Iraq.

The formal reasons for this failure are many, but there is only one real reason: The reason, contra Martin Van Creveld, is that the military  is prevented from victory.

Because of Imperium in Imperio, the “Blue government” of the State Department, Harvard and the New York Times (the institution of the priests) wants these military interventions to fail so that the military can be discredited.

If the military (the Pentagon, the institution of the soldiers) is discredited, then so is its main patron: the Republican Party. By discrediting (and degrading) both the military and the Republican Party, then those who vote for this Party are discredited and politically weakened.

9: Assumptions, Anomalies and the Delusions of Progress.

It is likely that some of the priestly caste that are the “brain cells” of the state  either do not perceive this crisis of security or are in deep, delusional, denial over it – assuming they even care.

Two examples demonstrate this claim.

The first is this book, and the second is this article.

Steven Pinker, writing here, summaries his argument that we live in remarkably peaceful, gentle, kind age:

Some of the evidence has been under our nose all along. Conventional history has long shown that, in many ways, we have been getting kinder and gentler. Cruelty as entertainment, human sacrifice to indulge superstition, slavery as a labor-saving device, conquest as the mission statement of government, genocide as a means of acquiring real estate, torture and mutilation as routine punishment, the death penalty for misdemeanors and differences of opinion, assassination as the mechanism of political succession, rape as the spoils of war, pogroms as outlets for frustration, homicide as the major form of conflict resolution—all were unexceptionable features of life for most of human history. But, today, they are rare to nonexistent in the West, far less common elsewhere than they used to be, concealed when they do occur, and widely condemned when they are brought to light.


At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million.


On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots.

Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent.


Observe the historically low levels of crime compared with the recent past — and the absence of any world wars since 1945. Over the very long haul, too, scholars such as Steven Pinker have found convincing evidence that violence among humans is at the lowest levels since the species first emerged.

The above stands as a fair description of what progressives sincerely believe reality to be. When you evaluate a claim, the following questions are to be asked:

1: What facts are missing?

2: What facts are misstated?

3: Is the reasoning cogent?

4: What is missing?

To begin with, we will address the reasoning (3) and examine the un-examined assumptions underpinning the reasoning. Let’s take Sullivan first.

A: Notice that Sullivan says “observe.” Observe what? Observe Stephen Pinker (i.e pay attention to authority). Here is an actual “observation” one could make. Choose any city in America or Europe, particularly one with a high concentration of non-white, non-Chinese people, and walk around at night, alone, and on foot. For extra points, put this proposal to local people and observe their reaction. For bonus points, however, if you’re a female, then walk around at night, alone and on foot in a city with a high concentration of Muslims.  Failing that, simply ask local women what they think of this proposal and observe their reactions.

The assumption here about “observation” is that there now exists, in many (most?) cities virtual no-go-zones that a white man or woman would not dare venture to enter at night, or even during daytime.

Let’s turn to Pinker now.

B: Pinker’s core assumption is that the percentages of violent deaths in small-scale societies versus modern, industrial societies are far lower (2 billion v 100 million) if one looks at the matter proportionally.

Why, however, make that assumption? What is worse? The deaths of 10 people or the deaths of ten-thousand? Ethically, it is surely worse. So, in terms of total number and in terms of ethics, the 20th Century is, by far, the most destructive and death ridden century in human history.

C: Pinker claims, as does Sullivan, that since 1945 major wars with massive deaths are infrequent, and that the Western world has been remarkably peaceful. What is missing here is the fact that after history’s most bloodiest war, Europe was occupied by two superpowers that had absolute control of the means of violence. Conquest, by leaving a wasteland, tends to create peace. For instance, in Italy, after the triumph of Octavian, there was no doubt a great deal of peace, but this was built on the bones of two civil wars, riots, a slave rebellion and decades of bloody foreign conquests. Again, starting the clock at 1946 does not really tell us very much.

D: What is missing from Pinker’s claim – both about post 1945 and the entire 20th Century – is that from 1815 to 1914, there was a century of, relatively speaking, peace and stability in Europe (which followed the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration of Monarchy). Then, after the the suicide of civilisation in WW1, you had the Russian Revolution, the purges, the state created famines in Eastern Europe, then the Chinese Communist victory (which laid the ground for the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” and “Cultural Revolution”).

Moreover, the triumph of Communism led to the Korean War, and the prison-state regime of the Kims. Decolonisation in India, Africa and the Middle East produced genocide, war and tyranny; indeed, Pinker’s claim that wars are rarely fought to a bloody conclusion today actually prolongs conflict for decades as in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and today’s Syrian civil war. (Edward Luttwak has an interesting proposal about this.)

What about Iran and Iraq? What about the Congo, or Sudan? What about Mexico and the drug wars?

Is this actually progress, or is it the sometimes slow, but sometimes fast and violent decay of global peace, security and law?

E: Pinker assumes that a world war has not happened since 1945. This is not true. Today, USG and its allies now fight a world war against Islamic Jihad. Islamic Jihad, moreover, has attacked China, Russia and India. This war – De Bello Islamica – is fought on four continents, in multiple countries and with numerous cities involved.

F: Finally, Pinker’s arguments rest on a kind of inductive fallacy – that the past will resemble the future. Who could have imagined that in 1910, within a 40 year period, you would have witnessed two World Wars; Communism, Fascism and Socialism; numerous post-colonial wars; Europe under Soviet occupation and the emergence of the “Cold War” with something called Nuclear weapons capable of obliterating entire cities, indeed, entire countries.

G: Note, we have not discussed “facts” (or statistics); we have explored assumptions. We have explored how we think about the “facts”; what we focus on and what we do not. The assumptions by which we reason are often more important than the facts themselves.

However, let’s turn now to the “facts” themselves.

Here are fourteen facts that demonstrate the violence has not declined, or is declining and that, in fact, we are living through a breakdown in domestic security because the state is no longer functioning as it should

1: Crime rose consistently in England in the 20th Century.

2: France has existed in a state of national emergency for nearly two years.

3: Sweden’s Malmö is the “rape capital” of the world, or at least Europe.

4: Violent crime and murder both rose in 2015 in America.

5: Crime is increasing in California. 

6: Chicago’s had the “deadliest July” in ten years in 2016.

7: Stabbings in London rose by nearly a “third” in 2017.

8: Sexual slavery returned in the second decade of the 21st Century. 

9: Slavery makes a comeback.

10: U.S has the highest rate of imprisonment in the world.

11: England’s prison population has been rising since the war, and increasingly since the 1990’s. More prisoners are spending more time in jail for violent and sexual crimes. 

12: FBI confirm mass shootings have been rising in America since 2000.

13: Homicide rises “11 percent” in England and Wales and ” a 27% rise in violence against the person” offences for 2015. 

14: The number of police officers being killed in America is on the rise in 2016:  “police officers killed by firearms was up 17 percent.  That echoes findings from the pro-gun-control Brady Campaign in May.  The group concluded that at that time,  the number of officers murdered by guns was up 70 percent.”

No doubt, the claims that crime is on the rise and that security is declining can be questioned, and it will be the progressives and the professors in universities who question it.

However, beyond the question of facts and statistics, can we trust the figures? Can we trust the public policy experts? What’s missing from the debate is the assumption that you have trust in those who get to set the “null hypothesis”. Who has the authority (and can you trust them) to say that claim X has “no evidence” or “insufficient evidence”?

If there is no prior trust in the “expert”, or the institution they represent, then how much credence can we give to their judgement?

If you doubt the accuracy, fairness and trustworthiness of Harvard and the universities more generally, the New York Times, the BBC and the mass media more generally, who can you trust?

Peer into the black hole with the following:









Pinker and Sullivan are not only wrong, they are not even wrong.

If you want to know about the history and causes of the crime explosion and the reasons behind it in America, we recommend you read this review by Master Handle of the Collapse of the American Criminal Justice by William J. Stunz, a work we will extensively draw from later in this manifesto.

Imperial Energy presses on, however, to get at the very root of the problems.

The priests hold a number of assumptions that are ultimately responsible for the crisis of crime, chaos and conflict. These assumptions are false or dangerously incomplete and they require either wholesale rejection or drastic revision:

1: Human Neurological Uniformity & Equality V Human Biological Diversity & Order.

The assumption that all men are the same and that differences in life result from different environments has masked, among other things, that some men are more likely to commit crime than others. To say that some races are more likely to commit crime than others is to commit a kind of “heresy.”

Heresy, however, has no place in science. It has no place in the security of the state either. A state may deceive others out of necessity, but a state must never deceive itself.

2: Non-Western Immigration.

One consequence from the first assumption is that people in Western societies are taught to believe that they should have no reason to see any problem with immigration from non-Western societies. Western and non-Western people are, however, different: biologically, psychologically, culturally and religiously. These difference explain, when taken together (the respective weights may be difficult to untangle), the differences in crime.

3: Human Rights and Social Justice.

The first two assumptions cannot be questioned, never mind reversed, because they have been “enshrined” in various “Human or Civil Rights” laws. Again, the approximate origin of these dogmas is the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. If someone tries to question, criticise or complain about any of these three assumptions, then they risk unemployment, jail or violent attack.

4: The “War” on Drugs is Necessary, Morally Sound and Winnable.

America’s war on drugs has destroyed the peace of all or nearly all of USG’s major urban centres and the African-American community and has devastated Latin America; rather than secure life and property, it has destroyed them; rather than prevent or mitigate the harms that drug taking can cause, it has exacerbated them; after decades of waging “war” against drugs, the war is more unwinnable now than it ever was; indeed, the war on drugs can never be won.

5: Form V Reality.

There is no end to the formal arguments and formal explanations that can be given for the assumptions, the resulting policies and their ultimate failures; however, in reality, these assumptions and the mayhem they have caused are ultimately explained by Imperium in Imperio.

In other words, the fact that Detroit or Baltimore is a gang infested, death ridden, crime sink and that in England possibly thousands of poor, white children were drugged, raped and trafficked results from the insecure Ruling Elites enacting policies that secure their power without any regard for the violence and disorder than results from it.

10: The Reality Behind the Formal Assumptions.

1: Equality.

The Ruling Elite, who manage the unsecure, centralising state, must, in order to secure their power, degrade and destroy any competing or recalcitrant power-centre or institution. Historically, this was the Church; later, however, it was the Aristocracy, then the free market. Post-War, it was the family, workplaces, schools and universities, segregated neighbourhoods, the police and military. Today, the central conflict is over the concept of the nation state itself.

Since power and especially the naked exercise of power – force –  must nearly always mask its true intentions, a formula or a formal reason must be given. The crucial, but formal, assumption then, that underpins all of the other assumptions, is HNU and the Ideal of Equality.

In reality, equality is simply the intellectual acid that justifies breaking down the chemical bonds of order and liberty. The result is “levelling down” equalising or “atomisation”.

Recall the first two Rules of Ruling:

Rule 1:

Keep your winning coalition as small as possible. A small coalition allows a leader to rely on very few people to stay in power. Fewer essentials equals more control and contributes to more discretion over expenditures.

(Strong and Secure HighSmall and Weak Middle.)

Rule 2:

Keep your nominal selectorate as large as possible. Maintain a large selectorate of interchangeables and you can easily replace any troublemakers in your coalition, influentials and essentials alike. After all, a large selectorate permits a big supply of substitute supporters to put the essentials on notice that they should be loyal and well behaved or else face being replaced.

In short, in an unsecure political system such as a technocracy – even with residual democratic elements – the Ruling Elite must form coalitions with any group willing to vote for them in order to gain and maintain power.

This is the reason why we see so many “anomalies”, such as:

A: The rich and powerful Ruling Elite, who all have Ivy League educations, form political coalitions with minorities, immigrants and Islamists who are neither “educated” at the Ivy leagues, or work in elite professions such as the judiciary, the civil service or the media.

B: While the Ruling Elite profess tolerance, atheism and sexual non-conformism, they support the immigration of Muslims whose values are diametrically opposed to their values.

C: The Ruling Elite consider their beliefs in Equality to be “scientific”, yet the belief in Human Neurological Uniformity is inconsistent with the scientific evidence.

While the following counter-factual can never be proven, the Patron Theory of Politics, derived from the Grand Master, would suggest that if USG contained a one Party State, comprised of people who would have otherwise belonged to either the Democrat or Republican Parties, the formal assumptions and resulting policies would have been completely different.

While there are no facts to support this claim, we can use logic to understand why the claim is plausible.

A one Party oligarchy understands that, without the Kabuki theatre of democratic elections, there is no other outlet of popular discontent, other than either rioting or rebellion. Persistent rioting, and full scale rebellion, requires the security services to deter the rioters and put down the rebellion. Since an oligarchy – especially an oligarchy of priests – can never be completely confident in the loyalty of the security forces, violent repression – even if lawful and sensible – risks causing the security forces to side with the “people”.

In other words, an undemocratic state has no release valve for the pressure that results from irresponsible, poor government. Consequently, while the Ruling Elite enrich themselves and their children, they all understand that in the event of a rebellion or revolution, they risk losing not only their power and wealth, but their lives.

Thus, there is a check, resulting from fear, on the Ruling Elite. True, there is graft and corruption, at times endemic; however, if the inner circle of the Ruling Elite carries out periodic purges or “anti-corruption drives” (starting with their rivals, of course) then public anger can usually be sated.

While this is logical, it cannot be proved with facts regarding a counter-factual America. Nevertheless, modern China offers not only facts to support this theory; it also offers a model as proof.

For decades, and now for years after the Tiananmen Square protests, China has not undergone a revolution or insurrection from the Han majority, despite having zero democratic influence on the government.

China’s cities, from Shanghai to Guangzhou, are peaceful, secure, and lawful; its citizens, moreover, arguably enjoy more personal freedom than most Americans and nearly all Europeans.

Few Westerners are aware of this, or tease out the logic as to why this is so. Probably because of the language barrier, the total dominance of the Western media, and China’s disinterest in pointing out (or exporting) the superiority of their model. Thus, there is no no “competitive pressure” for Western Ruling Elites to constrain themselves.


The crisis of global and domestic insecurity – unorganised and organised violence – can be denied and dismissed – to some extent – if there are enough gold and good times to go around. Failing that, the state can censor, distort or not report inconvenient truths and distract people with movies, games and videos.

This is no longer so, because the last two pillars -economics and the Narrative – are also in crisis.


41 thoughts on “STEEL-cameralist Manifesto Part 3c: The Age of Crisis; Crime, Chaos, Conflict and the Centralising Power.

  1. Spectacularly done. One of the most coherent and summary assessments of the monstrosity behind the ironically named “Pax Americana”. Much like the faltering of the Ottoman Empire, we find that in it’s latter days the American Empire operates at the EXPENSE of the very nation which founded/fuels it.

    “4: The “War” on Drugs is Necessary, Morally Sound and Winnable.

    America’s war on drugs has destroyed the peace of all or nearly all of USG’s major urban centres and the African-American community and has devastated Latin America; rather than secure life and property, it has destroyed them; rather than prevent or mitigate the harms that drug taking can cause, it has exacerbated them; after decades of waging “war” against drugs, the war is more unwinnable now than it ever was; indeed, the war on drugs can never be won.”

    This was the one point I’m stuck on. It’s not that the war isn’t winnable, but rather that the USG has never decided to earnestly wage it, much less WIN IT. Another example of the Form v. Reality disjunction.

    It goes, in order of ascending preference towards political order:
    1. Half Measure “War on Drugs”
    2. Decriminalization of Drugs (Stay illegal ostensibly)
    3. Total/All-out War on Drug trade; ride into their compounds on armoured steel horses spewing forth death, and hang every survivor after conviction. Annihilate the organizations and institutions for reasons both Sovereign and Moral.


    1. Thank you.

      “This was the one point I’m stuck on. It’s not that the war isn’t winnable, but rather that the USG has never decided to earnestly wage it, much less WIN IT. Another example of the Form v. Reality disjunction.”

      We have engaged in a little rhetorical blasting on this question.

      You are, of course, correct in what you say.

      Later, in our manifesto, we will much more to say about this problem. We brought up the topic of the war on drugs because it will be a key plank in our proposals for Urban Reform.

      We will give you a sneak preview of what we mean.

      African-Americans are the foundations of the Democrat Party strength. Any prospective restoration will have to confront these foot soldiers of the progressives.

      STEEL-cams aim to steal them.

      Reform on the “Drug War” will form a large part of that stratagem

      You mention, at the end, “moral” reasons for the drug war. We disagree. Hope your here for when we get into this topic in depth.


    1. Yes. It is surprising how much his argument now forms the main defence for progressives on this topic.

      On of the stumbling blocks that people have is that they focus on “statistics” and the question: “has crime gone down.”

      There is something wrong with the whole line of thinking. We will have to say about this in a supplementary post.


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